New York Motion Picture Censorship Law by unknown
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 1 
Number 1 Volume 1, January 1955, Number 1 Article 11 
March 2016 
New York Motion Picture Censorship Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1955) "New York Motion Picture Censorship Law," The Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 1 : No. 1 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol1/iss1/11 
This Legislation is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
LEGISLATION
New York Motion Picture
Censorship Law
Authority for the censorship of motion pic-
tures in New York State is found in Section
122 of the Education Law which provides
that a license shall be issued after inspection
of a film unless it or any part of it ". . . is
obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacri-
legious, or is of such a character that its
exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or
incite to crime. . . ." No motion picture (other
than scientific, educational or current events
films) may be exhibited in any place of
amusement for pay or in connection with any
business in the State of New York unless it
has been licensed.
Recently, within a comparatively short pe-
riod, the Supreme Court of the United States
has reviewed two provisions of the New York
censorship statute and found them to be un-
constitutional. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Board of
Regents refused to issue a license on the
ground that the picture was "sacrilegious."
The Supreme Court reversed an earlier deci-
sion [Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial
Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915)]
and held that expression by means of motion
pictures was included within the free speech
and free press guarantee of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and that the stand-
ard under attack was so vague and indefinite
as to offend the Due Process Clause. In Com-
mercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of the State of New York, 346 U.S.
587 (1954), the provision for withholding a
license from a film on the grounds that it was
"immoral" and "tended to corrupt morals"
was held unconstitutional. In a brief memo-
randum decision in which the Burstyn case
was cited, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the New York Court of Appeals
which had held the provision constitutional.
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court is bound by
the determination of the highest court of the
state in the latter's construction of the statute
or any of its terms. [See Hebert v. Louisiana,
272 U.S. 312, 317 (1926)]. However, in the
Commercial Pictures case, although there was
a 4-2 decision in the Court of Appeals of New
York upholding the constitutionality of the
statute, the four members of the majority were
unable to concur in the meaning of the term
"immoral." Two judges regarded the statute
as referring to "sexual immorality"; one
judge construed it as meaning "contra bonos
mores"; and the fourth held that the term
comprised both elements. Consequently, it is
not surprising that the Supreme Court could
be persuaded that the term was vague and
without definite content.
In both cases, appellants' primary argu-
ment was that all censorship of movies was,
per se, unconstitutional. The Supreme Court,
however, did not so hold. Indeed, Justice
Clark, speaking in the Burstyn case for a
unanimous Court, stated [at page 502] that
"It does not follow that the Constitution re-
quires absolute freedom to exhibit every mo-
tion picture of every kind at all times and all
places."
With the exception of Justice Douglas, who
has consistently voiced the opinion that cen-
sorship is unconstitutional per se, [see con-
curring opinions in Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S.
960 (1952), and Commercial Pictures Corp.
v. Regents of the University of the State of
New York, supra] and with the possible ex-
ception of Justice Black, who joined with Jus-
tice Douglas in the concurring opinion of the
last cited case, the members of the Supreme
Court have not committed themselves to a
position adverse to a proper form of censor-
ship. Indeed, their recorded utterances would
seem to align them in favor of a properly
drawn censorship statute. [See Arguments
Before the Court, 22 U.S. Law Week 3181
(1954), 20 U.S. Law Week 3281 (1952)].
Justice Reed, assuming the validity of a licens-
ing system in the Burstyn case, concurred with
the majority on the ground that that particu-
lar film was not one which the First Amend-
ment would permit a state to exclude from
public view [at page 506]. Justice Frank-
furter, with whom Justices Jackson and Bur-
ton joined, concurred with the majority in the
Burstyn case in an opinion devoted entirely
to the contention that the word "sacrilegious"
was so vague as to offend the Due Process re-
quirements of the Fourteenth Amendment [at
pp. 507-533]. Similarly, in his concurring
opinion in the Gelling case, Justice Frank-
furter agreed with the decision of the majority
but again limited his remarks to the question
of indefiniteness of the statutory standard.
It appears, therefore, that the Supreme
Court would uphold the validity of a system
of prior restraints if the provisions of the
statute were so clear, precise, and unambigu-
ous as to satisfy the requirements of definite-
ness under the Due Process Clause. [See Win-
ters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)]. In
this connection, it should be noted that the
Supreme Court of Illinois, in a decision sub-
sequent to the Commercial Pictures and Su-
perior Films cases, upheld the right of the
City of Chicago to ban a film on the ground
that it is obscene, rejecting the contention
that the Burstyn, Gelling, Commercial Pic-
tures Corp. or Superior Films, Inc. cases re-
quired a different result. The film which the
Chicago censor banned on the ground of ob-
scenity, "The Miracle," was the same film
which New York unsuccessfully attempted to
ban on the ground that it was sacrilegious.
[See American Civil Liberties Union v. City
of Chicago, 121 N.E. 2d 585 (Ill. 1954)].
In view of these two successful attacks on
the constitutionality of the provisions of the
New York motion picture censorship law,
the New York Legislature by Chapter 620 of
the Laws of 1954 amended the Education
Law by adding a new Section 122-a which
defines some of the terms used in Section
122. The legislation was precipitated pri-
marily to overcome the decision of the Su-
preme Court in the Commercial Pictures Cor-
poration case, which held that the banning of
the film "La Ronde" on the grounds that it
was immoral was unconstitutional. New Sec-
tion 122-a which defines "immoral," "of such
a character that its exhibition would tend to
corrupt morals" and "incite to crime" reads as
follows:
§ 122-a. Definitions.
1. For the purpose of section one hundred
twenty-two of this chapter, the term "im-
moral" and the phrase "of such a character
that its exhibition would tend to corrupt
morals" shall denote a motion picture film or
part thereof, the dominant purpose or effect
of which is erotic or pornographic; or which
portrays acts of sexual immorality, perver-
sion, or lewdness, or which expressly or im-
pliedly presents such acts as desirable, ac-
ceptable or proper patterns of behavior.
2. For the purpose of section one hundred
twenty-two of this chapter, the term "incite to
crime" shall denote a motion picture the dom-
inant purpose or effect of which is to suggest
that the commission of criminal acts or con-
tempt for law is profitable, desirable, accept-
able, or respectable behavior; or which ad-
vocates or teaches the use of, or the methods
of use of, narcotics or habit-forming drugs.
Although the Legislature omitted to define
the term "sacrilegious," it may have been mo-
tivated by the difficulty of defining the term
rather than by its concurrence in the unfor-
tunate holding of the Burstyn case that the
term admits of no precise definition. It is also
significant that the Legislature omitted to de-
fine the term "obscene" probably on the well-
founded belief that this term has acquired a
common law meaning of sufficient precision
to withstand attacks under the Due Process
Clause and that it had been, inferentially at
least, approved in the Burstyn case.
Although a more comprehensive statute
might have been more desirable, to the extent
that Section 122-a does define terms, it is so
clearly drawn that both the motion picture in-
dustry and the censoring agency have an ob-
jective standard by which they may be guided
and it would appear that the constitutional
requirement of definiteness has been met.
